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  DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE 




A.  Liberalization and trade performance 
 
  The basic policy challenge facing most developing countries is how to establish a 
broad and robust industrial base as the key to successful development, and how best to 
channel the elemental forces of trade and investment to this end.  Shifting away from 
dependence on the production and export of primary commodities towards industrial 
products has often been viewed as a means of more effective participation in the 
international division of labour.  Manufactures are expected to offer better prospects for 
export earnings not only because they allow for a more rapid productivity growth and 
expansion of production, but also because they hold out the promise of greater price 
stability even as volumes expand, thereby avoiding the declining terms-of-trade that has 
frustrated the development efforts of many commodity-dependent economies. 
 
  Since the early 1980s, moves to rapidly liberalize trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) have strongly influenced policy makers in many developing countries 
in their thinking about this challenge. Openness to international trade and investment was 
expected to allow these countries to alter both the pace and the pattern of their 
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participation in international division of labour, thereby overcoming balance-of-payments 
problems and accelerating technical progress and economic growth, to catch up with 
industrialized countries. 
 
    At the same time as developing countries strived hard to integrate more closely 
into the world economy, a new trade round was transforming the global playing field.  
The Uruguay Round Agreements were expected to be doubly favourable to developing 
countries.  On the one hand, a strong rules-based system would benefit smaller and 
poorer economies by subjecting the conduct of their major trading partners to greater 
transparency and discipline, and putting in place a system of reviews and sanctions which 
could not be subverted by powerful vested interests.  On the other hand, a more open 
trading environment was expected to strengthen the growth prospects of developing 
countries by pushing their producers to the efficiency frontier and improving their access 
to markets in the North.  The optimism was reflected in extravagant predictions made 
regarding the gains the developing countries would reap from the Uruguay Round.  
 
  Indeed, during the past two decades developing countries have become major 
players in world trade.  Their exports have grown faster than the world average and now 
account for about one third of world merchandise trade, rising from less than one fourth 
in the 1970s.  During this period, developing countries also became important markets for 
each others products: the share of trade among them reached 40 per cent of their total 
exports at the end of the millennium.   
 
  Much of the growth in the exports of developing countries has been in 
manufactures, which today account for over 70 per cent of their total exports, after 
hovering around 20 per cent during much of the 1970s and early 1980s.  The share of 
developing countries in world manufactured exports now exceeds 25 per cent, compared  
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to some 10 per cent in the 1970s.  
 
   More important, many developing countries appear to have succeeded in moving 
into technology-intensive manufactured exports, which have been among the most 
rapidly growing products in world trade over the past two decades.  For some products 
such as transistors and conductors, computers and office machines, and electric power 
machinery, developing country exports now account for between 40 and 50 per cent of 
total world exports.  Much of this expansion has taken place as a result of their growing 
participation in international production networks (IPNs) whereby production chains are 
split up and located in different countries by transnational corporations (TNCs) seeking 
low-cost producers for export to world markets. 
 
 
B. Trade  and  industrialization   
 
  However, on closer examination, the picture is much more nuanced and less 
sanguine. The success of developing countries in expanding their manufacturing exports 
and attracting export-oriented FDI has not always been accompanied by faster growth in 
their gross domestic product (GDP).  At some 4.8 per cent per annum, the average growth 
rate in developing countries during the 1990s was well below the average of 5.7 per cent 
achieved during the 1970s.  If China is excluded, the decline is much more pronounced, 
almost close to two percentage points. 
 
  Most countries which shifted from inward-oriented to outward-oriented 
development through a rapid liberalization of imports and FDI, particularly in Latin 
America, have not shared in the expansion of manufactured exports, but have 
experienced surges in imports and mounting trade deficits, resulting in increased  
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dependence on private capital inflows for growth.  On the other hand, attempts to attract 
private finance through capital account liberalization have made matters worse by 
generating boom-bust cycles in financial markets and misalignments and gyrations in 
exchange rates, undermining productive investment, particularly in the traded goods 
sectors.  
 
  Much of the expansion in manufactured exports of developing countries has 
concentrated in East Asia and, to a lesser extent, Central America.  However, with the 
exception of a few East Asian first-tier newly industrializing economies (NIEs), mainly 
Korea and Taiwan, which have already reached income levels as high as some 
industrialized countries, the exports of developing countries are still concentrated on 
products derived essentially from the exploitation of natural resources and the use of 
unskilled or semi-skilled labour which have limited prospects for productivity growth and 
lack dynamism in world markets.   
 
  Trade statistics showing a rapid expansion of technology-intensive, high value-
added exports from developing countries are misleading, because of double-counting of 
trade among countries linked through IPNs.  Such products appear to be exported by 
developing countries, but in reality those countries are often involved only in the low-
skill, assembly stages of production, using technology-intensive parts and components 
imported from more advanced countries.  As trade flows are measured in gross-value 
rather than value-added, imported parts and components are counted among the exports 
of the countries assembling them.  Consequently, although developing countries appear 
to have become major players in world markets for supply-dynamic, high-tech products, 
they still account only for 10 per cent of world exports of products which score high in 




  In the past two decades the increased mobility of capital, together with continued 
restrictions over labour movements and various incentives provided by the recipients of 
FDI, has extended the reach of IPNs particularly in three sectors:  clothing, the 
automotive industry and electronics.  Trade based on specialization within such networks 
is estimated to account for up to 30 per cent of world exports.  In the clothing sector 
although FDI has played some role, the major form of production relocation is sub-
contracting to domestic enterprises.  The electronics industry is the most globalized of all 
industries, and trade in electronics products is underpinned by an increasing geographical 
dispersion of TNC-driven production networks.  Relocation of production in the 
automobile sector is constrained by physical distance to the final market, and is greatly 
influenced by preferential regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA and Mercosur.    
 
  Almost three quarters of the increase in the share of developing countries in world 
manufacturing exports have taken place in the three sectors in which IPNs have expanded 
rapidly in recent years.  In these networks, notably in electronics and the automotive 
industries, most of the technology and skills are embodied in imported parts and 
components, and much of the value-added accrues to producers in more advanced 
countries where these parts and components are produced, and to the TNCs involved.  
The share of developing countries in value-added is determined by the cost of the least 
scarce and weakest factor, namely unskilled and semi-skilled labour, whereas the rewards 
to scarce but internationally mobile factors such as capital, management and know-how 
are reaped by their foreign owners.  It is in effect the labour itself, rather than the product 
of labour, that is exported. 
 
  Consequently, while the share of developing countries in world manufacturing 
exports, including high-tech products, appears to have been expanding rapidly, incomes 
earned from such activities by these countries do not share in this dynamism.  On this  
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score, a comparison between the developed and developing countries over the past two 
decades is highly revealing.   Although the share of developed countries in world 
manufactured exports fell from more than 80 per cent to about 70 per cent between 1980 
and the end of the 1990s, they actually increased their share in world manufacturing 
value-added in the same period. In these countries, manufacturing value-added has 
consistently exceeded manufactured exports over the past two decades.  
 
  Developing countries, by contrast, have achieved a steeply rising ratio of 
manufactured exports to GDP, but without a significant upward trend in the ratio of 
manufacturing value-added to GDP.  In the major exporters of manufactures in the South, 
export values have constantly exceeded manufacturing value-added during the past two 
decades, and the gap has increased further as exports have grown faster.  Thus, the 
increase in the share of developing countries in world manufacturing exports has not been 
accompanied by a concomitant increase in their shares in world manufacturing value-
added. 
 
  These comparisons relate to value-added generated in developed and developing 
countries, rather than incomes earned from manufacturing activities.  The value-added 
left in developing countries is smaller and the income earned by industrial countries is 
larger if account is taken of profits earned by TNCs on their investment in developing 
countries.   
 
 
C.  A stylized picture of diversity in trade and industrial development  
 
  This general picture no doubt hides diversity among developing countries in their 
experience regarding trade and industrialization over the past two decades.  In this  
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respect, it is possible to distinguish among four categories: 
 
$  Mature industrializers:  This group includes the first-tier NIEs, notably Korea and 
Taiwan, which have already achieved industrial maturity through a rapid 
accumulation of capital, growth in industrial employment, productivity and output, 
as well as manufactured exports.  These economies have seen a large increase in 
their shares in both world manufacturing income and exports over the past two 
decades.  They still have a share of industrial output in GDP above the levels of 
advanced countries, but as expected, industrial growth has started to slow down. 
 
$  New generation of industrializers:  These are countries with a rising share of 
manufactures in total output, employment and exports, based on strong investment 
and upgrading from resource-based activities to labour-intensive manufactures and 
middle-range technology products.  This group includes the second-tier NIEs 
(notably Malaysia and Thailand) and, to a lesser extent, China, all extensively 
participating in IPNs.  However, in these countries industrial deepening has 
advanced much less than that suggested by their manufactured exports.  In 
Malaysia, for instance, between 1980 and 2000 the share of manufactured exports 
in GDP increased by 42 percentage points while the increase in manufacturing 
value-added as a proportion of GDP was  around 6 percentage points.  In China 
manufacturing value-added as a proportion of GDP fell over the same period as a 
result of rationalization associated with a move away from central planning, while 
the share of manufacturing exports in GDP increased by some 10 percentage 
points.  
 
$  Enclave industrializers:  This group includes countries which have also moved 
away from dependence on commodity exports by linking to IPNs with a heavy  
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reliance on imported inputs and machinery.  However, their overall performance 
in terms of investment, value-added and productivity growth is poor.  Two 
countries stand out in this group, namely Mexico and the Philippines, where 
manufactured exports as a proportion of GDP rose rapidly during 1980-2000 while 
manufacturing value-added stagnated or declined.  
 
$  Deindustrializers: This group includes most middle-income countries in Latin 
America, notably Argentina and Brazil, which have achieved a certain degree of 
industrialization but have been unable to sustain a dynamic process of structural 
change through rapid accumulation and growth.  In a context of rapid 
liberalization, there have often been declining or stagnant shares of manufactured 
exports, employment and output, and a downgrading to less technology-intensive 
activities.  In some countries in this group, notably Chile, there has been a less 
destructive pattern of deindustrialization as a result of a fast pace of investment, 
accelerating growth based on natural resources.  However, this process now 
appears to have reached its limits. 
 
  With the notable exception of the first-tier NIEs, therefore, recent expansion in 
manufacturing exports of developing countries has generally been associated with their 
increased participation in IPNs, and generated a much more modest growth in 
manufacturing value-added in these countries.  As a result, developing countries appear 
to be a lot more successful when their performance is measured in terms of 
manufacturing trade than in terms of manufacturing value-added and income.   
 
  Indeed the contrast between the two measures becomes even more evident when a 
comparison is made between the structures of trade and industrial output, using five 
broad categories of products: primary commodities, labour and resource-based  
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manufactures, and low, medium and high technology-intensive manufactures.  Such a 
comparison shows that developing countries are becoming increasingly similar to 
developed countries in the structure of their manufactured exports, but not in the structure 
of their manufacturing value-added and incomes.  But, again, there is diversity: 
 
$  Korea and Taiwan stand out for having reached a manufacturing value-added 
structure that is by far the closest to that prevailing in the leading developed 
countries.  In these countries productivity growth over the past two decades has 
exceeded the growth in the technological leaders in the North, notably the United 
States, in almost all sectors of the manufacturing industry. 
 
$  The manufactured export structure of a large number of developing countries 
extensively participating in IPNs, including China, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Philippines and Singapore, has also begun to resemble that of the major   
developed countries, but the similarity is much less so for the structure of their 
manufacturing value-added.  In most of these countries, including Malaysia, 
productivity growth has been faster than in the United States in the lower end of 
manufacturing but not in the upper end.   
 
$  For the majority of Latin American countries, not only the structure of 
manufacturing value-added but also that of exports is much less similar to those in 
the more advanced industrial countries.  In many of these countries productivity in 
labour-intensive manufacturing has been falling, and the processing of natural 
resources continues to dominate production and export activities. 
 
  Briefly, taken together, the evidence suggests that among the major developing 
countries, only the major first-tier NIEs have succeeded in simultaneously upgrading  
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their production and export structures by raising productivity in technology-intensive 
sectors and closing the gap with the industrial leaders.  Many developing countries 
relying on FDI and TNCs for expansion of industrial production and exports appear to be 
far behind in upgrading their production structures, but they are more successful than 
commodity-dependent Latin American economies in moving to manufacturing.        
 
  Clearly, participation in the labour-intensive segments of IPNs can yield 
considerable benefits for countries in the early stages of industrialization and with a great 
deal of surplus labour.  It can enable them to increase employment and per capita income 
even when value-added generated is low.  Furthermore, increased employment of low-
skilled labour in activities linked to IPNs can widen the possible range of sectors where 
industrialization can begin, and help acquire the basic techniques and organizational 
skills needed for a more broad-based growth.  However, that does not necessarily 
constitute a leap into a new pattern of rapid and sustained industrial growth.  
 
  These networks allow TNCs a good deal more flexibility in, and control over, their 
choice of investment locations.  Moreover, their productive assets, such as know-how, 
design and technology, can be locked more tightly inside the firm thanks to barriers of 
entry that result from the high costs of managing and coordinating such complex units.  
The packaged nature of FDI can, in these circumstances, be the cause of a highly skewed 
distribution of the gains from trade and investment unless local bargaining power can 
bring a more balanced outcome, as it did for the first-tier NIEs.   
 
  However, replicating the success of early industrializers is all the more difficult 
where such investment is highly mobile: locational advantages are easily won and lost 
through small cost changes or the emergence of alternative sites, giving rise to the danger 
of enclave economies where there is a persistently high dependence on imported  
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intermediate and capital goods.  These problems can be particularly serious for middle-
income countries which have been successful in early stages of industrialization but 
which now need rapid upgrading and productivity growth in order to advance further 
along the development path. 
 
  An important motive in seeking to attract FDI in export industries is its potential 
contribution to balance-of-payments.  Indeed, as long as the entire production is exported, 
participation in IPNs can make a positive contribution to the balance-of-payments in 
developing countries, barring such practices as transfer pricing, even if these activities are 
heavily dependent on imported parts and components, and the value-added left in the 
country is no more than the wages of unskilled labour.  However, the picture can change 
when the goods and services produced are sold in domestic markets.  More generally, the 
contribution of FDI to balance-of-payments varies inversely with the share of TNCs 
profits in value-added, the extent of their reliance on imports, and the proportion of final 
product sold in domestic markets.  In general, since the chunk of the value-added goes to 
profits, the import content is high, and the goods and services produced are partly sold in 
domestic markets, the contribution of FDI to balance-of-payments in developing 
countries is often negative.  
  
  This is the case even in China, one of the most successful countries in attracting 
export-oriented FDI.  At the end of the 1990s, total profits earned by foreign-funded 
enterprises (FFE) in China were in the order of $20 billion, of which $12 billion was 
reinvested in the country and the rest was taken out.  In the same period, these enterprises 
generated a net export surplus of $2 billion.  Thus, the FFE sector as a whole was in the 
red by some $6 billion even on cash-flow basis.  Available evidence suggests that a 
similar situation existed in Malaysia in the late 1980s and early 1990s when such deficits 
were covered simply by relying on new FDI, in much the same way as engaging in a  
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process of Ponzi financing – that is, servicing debt by incurring new debt. 
 
 
D. Competition  and  the  fallacy of composition 
 
  As a result of the increased participation of several highly populated, low-income 
countries in world trade in recent years, as much as 70 per cent of the labour force 
employed in sectors participating in world trade is low-skilled.  Besides, there is still a 
considerable amount of surplus labour in such countries, and many large countries are not 
yet fully integrated into the international trading system.  Thus, a simultaneous export 
drive by developing countries in labour-intensive manufactures, or increased competition 
among them to attract FDI as locations for labour-intensive processes, could rekindle the 
fallacy of composition or the adding-up problem: on its own a small developing country 
can substantially expand its exports without flooding the market and seriously reducing 
the prices of the products concerned, but this may not be true for developing countries as 
a whole, or even for large individual countries such as China and India.  The dangers of 
overproducing standardized mass products with high import dependence are typified by 
the electronics sector, where developing country export prices appear to be more volatile 
and to have fallen more steeply after 1995 than similar products traded among developed 
countries. 
 
  There are also more general signs that the prices of manufactured exports from 
developing countries have been weakening vis-à-vis manufactures exported by 
industrialized countries in recent years.  Evidence shows that productivity gains in 
resource-based and labour-intensive manufactures exported by developing countries do 
not always go to labour as higher wages, but often benefit consumers in western markets 
in lower prices.  These trends suggest increased commoditization of many labour- 
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intensive manufactures exported by developing countries. 
 
  Differences in the behaviour of prices of manufactures exported by developing 
and developed countries appear to arise primarily from differences in global market 
structures and domestic labour market conditions.  Because of the existence of significant 
barriers to entry in high-tech product lines associated with their high R&D contents and 
the high costs involved in organizing production chains, markets for such products are 
dominated by oligopolistic producers in industrialized countries usually competing on the 
basis of quality, design, marketing, branding and product differentiation, rather than 
price.  In such products, export market shares are much more concentrated than in 
manufactures exported by developing countries.  This is also true for products that 
require very large and specific investments, such as machinery or transport equipment. 
 
  By contrast, there is much stiffer competition among developing countries in 
markets for labour-intensive manufactures.  While these products provide opportunities 
for the new generation of industrializing economies, most middle-income developing 
countries also persist in these sectors because their producers find it difficult to upgrade 
and diversify.  Industrialized economies also continue to operate in such sectors behind 
protection, as weak growth and high unemployment have slowed the closure of their 
sunset industries, thereby restricting the size of the market for developing country 
producers. 
 
  Competitive pressures are further compounded by the way labour markets in 
developing countries accommodate the additional supply of labour-intensive 
manufactures through flexible wages, allowing firms to compete on the basis of price 
without undermining profitability.  Competition among firms, including TNCs, in 
developing countries becomes competition among labour located in different countries.  
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  With a growing number of developing countries, including some with very large 
unskilled labour pools, turning to export-oriented strategies, it is the middle-income 
countries in Latin America and South-East Asia that appear most vulnerable to these 
dynamics.  In particular, greater price competition in products of the electronics sector 
appears to have increasingly exposed traditional developing country exporters to the 
emergence of more competitive suppliers in countries with lower costs.  In the absence of 
a rapid upgrading to high-skill, high value-added manufactures needed to enable them to 
compete with more advanced industrial countries, these exporters may face a squeeze 
between the top and bottom ends of the markets for manufactures. 
 
  These challenges facing developing countries in international trade have been seen 
in recent years through the lens of international competitiveness.  However, a degree of 
caution is needed in applying this concept in the present context.  In the first place, 
strictly speaking, the concept may be useful to define the position of individual 
enterprises vis-à-vis each other, but not for comparisons among economies as a whole or 
even among industries comprising many firms with different characteristics: for, it is not 
countries but firms that trade.  From a private perspective it may matter little whether the 
international competitiveness of an enterprise is improved through productivity growth, 
wage cuts or a devaluation of the currency, but from a broader socio-economic point of 
view, these have totally different implications for economic growth, and social stability 
and welfare.   
 
  Evidence shows that wage suppression or sharp currency devaluations are not 
viable responses to the emergence of low-cost producers.  Many countries which sought 
to increase the international competitiveness of their firms in this way have failed to 
achieve sustained improvements in their manufactured export and value-added 
performance.  On the other hand, while productivity growth is a more secure way of  
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gaining a competitive edge for an individual country, a simultaneous drive by a large 
number of countries to improve productivity and to gain competitiveness in labour-
intensive manufactures can create gluts in these products and, hence, run against the 
problem of fallacy of composition, in much the same way as has happened in a number of 
primary commodities.  
 
 
E. Policy  challenges 
 
  The basic policy issue facing developing countries in the trading system is not, 
fundamentally, one of more or less trade liberalization, but how best to extract from their 
participation in that system the elements that will promote economic development.  For 
some this is still a matter of switching from primary commodities, but for many others it 
is a question of advancing further in industrial development.  There is enough evidence 
that there might be a risk of excessive competition among developing countries in world 
markets for labour-intensive manufactures and for FDI as locations for labour-intensive 
segments of IPNs.  This could disrupt the development process by causing significant 
terms-of-trade losses and create serious frictions in the global trading system.  To what 
extent such potential problems can be avoided will depend on three sets of factors: 
 
$  First, on faster growth of markets for labour-intensive manufactures in more 
advanced countries – both the industrialized countries and the first-tier NIEs – 
which in turn depends on faster income growth as well as improved market access; 
 
$  Second, on how quickly the middle-income countries are able to move out of 




$  Third, on the extent to which developing countries can rely on the expansion of 
domestic markets for industrial development.     
 
  Regarding potential markets in industrialized countries, it was estimated in the 
1999 Trade and Development Report that developing countries would be able to earn an 
additional $700 billion per annum from exports of labour-intensive manufactures if 
protectionist barriers were dismantled.  This amounts to 60 per cent of earnings from 
manufactured exports that the developing countries registered at the beginning of 2000.  
However, recent trends in trade policies in industrial countries do not suggest any easing 
of restrictions in such sectors.  On the contrary, there has been increased abuse of anti-
dumping measures.  There are also concerns over the implementation of the Agreement 
on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).  The impact of removal of quotas in developed countries 
can lead them to invoke the safeguards included in the ATC to prevent “serious damage” 
to domestic industry, and delay the removal of remaining quotas.  But even if trade in 
textiles and clothing were to be brought fully under WTO rules, it could still be impeded 
by relatively high tariffs and tariff escalation in the main developed country importers. 
 
  The mounting pressure in industrialized countries to raise the level of protection 
against imports of labour-intensive manufactures stems from the coincidence of high 
unemployment levels and growing wage inequality in these countries with sharp 
increases in labour-intensive manufactured imports from developing countries.  But 
renewed protectionism is not a viable option.  Difficulties arising from increased 
competition can best be addressed in industrialized countries by making sure that the full 
range of macroeconomic and structural policies is employed to accelerate growth and 
reduce unemployment.  That is how they absorbed the entry of low-cost producers such 




  The growth of trade among developing countries also opens new opportunities for 
avoiding difficulties in markets for labour-intensive products.  In particular, industrial 
upgrading in more advanced developing countries would allow new players to take over 
labour-intensive activities in world trade.  This has happened to a certain extent.   
Countries like China that have adopted more export-oriented strategies have gained much 
of the market share given up by the first-tier NIEs when they shifted to more technology-
intensive exports. However, because of the failure to undertake timely industrial 
upgrading, some exporters in the middle-income countries seem to have been negatively 
affected.  Their problems can be aggravated if large countries such as China and India 
rapidly expand their exports in labour-intensive manufactures.  Upgrading in many of 
these middle-income countries should involve the replacement of imported parts and 
components with domestically produced ones.  In this process, the shares of both imports 
and exports in GDP would be expected to fall as domestic value-added grew faster, 
reversing the trend observed in countries participating in IPNs. 
 
  Certainly, the industrial upgrading needed in the middle-income countries 
depends, to a large extent, on the policies they pursue in areas such as trade, industry and 
technology. Many of the policy measures successfully used in the past for this purpose, 
not only by the first-tier NIEs but also by industrialized countries, are no longer available 
because of multilateral commitments made by developing countries in the WTO, notably 
in TRIPs, TRIMs and subsidies.  Moreover, effective substitutes for such measures may 
not always be easy to find.  There is, thus, a need to reconsider, in the WTO review 
process, the full impact on development of limiting the policy options open to developing 
countries.  It is also important that developing countries resist attempts to narrow their 
policy space further by extracting new commitments from them in areas such as FDI, 




  It is often suggested, particularly in the business community, that services provide 
new opportunities for middle-income countries with well-educated populations in 
maintaining the growth momentum in the face of increased competition in labour-
intensive manufactures.  While some business opportunities may indeed exist, what is at 
stake here may be different when one shifts from a corporate perspective to broader 
development objectives.  Deepening the services sector is unlikely to ensure income 
convergence with industrial countries except for economies with massive hinterlands 
such as Hong Kong.  The historical experience shows that the services sector takes over 
and a process of benign de-industrialization starts at much higher income and 
productivity levels than those achieved by middle-income  countries; that is, at around 
$9.000.  Indeed a problem facing many developing countries today is that 
deindustrialization has been occurring and the share of services rising at levels of 
industrial productivity and per capita income that are much lower than in industrialized 
economies.  More important, this has been happening in the context of erratic and slow 
growth.  It would be a fallacy to think that middle-income countries could converge 
towards the income levels of highly industrialized countries by simply rapidly moving 
into services, before achieving industrial maturity.       
 
  Similarly, the limits of services in providing new trade opportunities would need 
to be recognized.  A number of services, particularly those related to data processing, 
have been moving to middle-income developing countries with well-educated 
populations.  However, the pros and cons of this are very much like those entailed by 
participation in IPNs. These countries have a competitive edge in such services because 
their wages are lower than those in industrialized countries; that is, because they are less-
developed.  But low wages have very little to do with the efficiency of labour in the 
services performed.  A data analyst or a doctor in Kuala Lumpur is not necessarily less 
skilful or productive than their counterparts in Europe, but he or she earns a much lower  
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wage because the overall productivity of the economy is much lower.  And for most 
countries, there is no other way of raising overall productivity than industrial 
development.  
        
  Finally, to avert potential difficulties in labour-intensive manufactures, larger 
developing economies, including China and India, will need to find ways of utilizing 
domestic sources of growth more fully.  It is true that growth of manufacturing and 
industrialization in the first-tier NIEs depended heavily on expansion of exports, 
particularly at the early stages of their development.  However, these countries were poor 
in natural resources, and this necessitated a rapid move into labour-intensive 
manufacturing to earn the foreign exchange needed for imports essential for 
development.  Moreover, they were small in size; collectively their population is smaller 
than that of Guangdong Province in China.  Thus, their industries needed to seek markets 
abroad in order to achieve the necessary economies of scale in production.  Indeed, 
historical evidence demonstrates, in general, an inverse relationship between trade 
orientation and economic size; among countries with similar levels of per capita income, 
the ratio of trade to income tends to be lower in countries with larger populations.   
Therefore, countries such as China and India can rely less on foreign markets for their 
industrialization than did the first-tier NIEs.  This would provide greater space for smaller 
newcomers in labour-intensive manufactures. 
 
  A strengthening of regional economic ties could also help this process along in 
East Asia and South America.  Conventional economic thinking tends to dismiss regional 
arrangements as a second-best solution for meeting development goals, and as a potential 
stumbling-block on the road to a fully open and integrated multilateral system.  However, 
this conclusion is based on a somewhat utopian view of the global economy.  Where 
domestic firms still have weak technological and productive capacities, and the global  
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economic context is characterised by biases and asymmetries, regional arrangements may 
well provide the most supportive environment in which to pursue national development 
strategies. 
 
  Greater regional economic integration increases the risk that problems in one 
country may be transmitted to its neighbours.  Arguably, that danger has intensified in 
today`s globalizing world, as was seen in East Asia during 1997-1998.  With volatile 
capital flows fuelling boom–bust cycles, a more fragile macroeconomic context has 
developed, vulnerable to shifting investor sentiments.  Thus, a return to stable and rapid 
regional growth needs to be underpinned not only by policies directed at the upgrading of 
production and exports, but also by accompanying regional monetary arrangements and 
cooperation designed to ensure the stability of financial markets and achieve a stable 
pattern of intraregional exchange rates. 